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AUTHORS' MORAL RIGHTS AND THE COPYRIGHT 
LAW REVIEW COMMITTEE'S REPORT: 
W(H)ITHER SUCH RIGHTS NOW? 
DAVID VAVER* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1928, the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 
was amended to include a new Article 6bis, which provided that, indepen- 
dently of their copyright or economic rights, authors should enjoy rights of 
paternity and integrity in respect of their works: the right "to claim author- 
ship" and the right "to object to any distortion, mutiliation or other modifica- 
tion" of their work that would be prejudicial to their honour or reputation. 
These rights underpinned the concept of droij morc~l (so-called "moral right"), 
long recognized by a number of Continental European countries. The inter- 
national recognition of these rights was widely accepted as the principal 
achievement of the 1928 revision of the Convention. The rights were rein- 
forced in later revisions of the Convention, so that Article 6bis of the 1971 
Paris text, which Australia has ratified, now extends the right of integrity 
to "other derogatory action in relation to" copyright works and encourages 
countries to adopt a period of protection at least coterminous with 
copyright1. 
In September 1984, having been requested by the Attorney General of the 
Commonwealth to inquire into moral rights, the Copyright Law Review Com- 
mittee published a Discussion Paper on Moral Rights. It invited interested 
persons to make submissions, particularly on ten issues the Committee 
thought were of special importance. The issues were comprehensive: Should 
all or any of the moral rights recognised elsewhere be protected in Australia 
beyond the protection currently afforded by Australian law? Should protec- 
tion extend to all items covered by copyright, or only some? What should 
be the scope and duration of protection? Should the protection be included 
*Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York Univers~ty, Toronto; Visiting Professor 
and Exchange Scholar, Faculty of Law, Monash University, 1988. 
The other major copyright treaty by which Australia is bound, the Universal Copyright Con- 
vention signed in Geneva in 1952, does not expressly protect moral rights. However, it has 
been recently argued that the U.C.C.'s requirement that states must grant "adequate and 
effective protection" for authors' rights may now, or at least in the very near future, require 
protection to be extended to authors' moral rights: since states must protect those rights recog- 
nized by "civilized countries" and since most such countries now recognize moral rights, the 
remainder must therefore similarly provide such protection: Dietz, "Elements of moral right 
protection in the Universal Copyright Convention" (1987) Vol. 21 No. 3 Copyright Bulletin 
17, at 22-3. The theory, and hence Dietz's conclusion from it, is controversial: see Vaver, 
"The National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions: 
Part Two" (1986) 17 IIC 715, at 729 ff. 
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in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.) or in separate legislation? Could the rights 
be waived or otherwise lost, e.g., when the work was commercialised? Should 
the rights prevail over heritage and town planning legislation? What remedies 
should be available and who should resolve moral rights questions, the courts 
or another tribunal? 
After receiving and considering over 40 submissions, the Committee 
produced its Report on Moral Rights, dated January 1988 and released in 
March 1988. It was not unanimous. A majority of five of the nine members 
recommended that no legislation conferring moral rights on authors should 
be enacted. A variety of reasons were given: enactment would give rise to 
a number of serious practical problems; the theoretical basis for moral rights 
protection in a common law system "has not been identified"; there was 
insufficient pressure for enactment from authors themselves; few important 
moral rights violations occur in Australia; and the Australian community 
generally was unlikely to endorse moral rights laws.2 In contrast to the 
25-page majority report, a four-person minority produced a 69-page report, 
with a further 13 pages of footnotes, recommending that moral rights 
protection should indeed be included in the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth.), and 
indicating what form such legislation should take.3 
It would be a pity if Australia's policy on moral rights were to be settled 
in accord with the majority's conclusion. The majority report contains simply 
too many contradictions and unsupportable statements to carry conviction. 
Tom Brown said of his tutor: "I do  not love thee, Dr Fell,/The reason why 
I cannot tell;" and this doggerel ultimately epitomises the majority's reaction 
to moral rights. To  disprove the majority case does not, of course, prove 
the truth of the minority's; and, indeed, not all of the minority's reasoning 
supporting the legislative introduction of moral rights is sound. However, 
a combination of those valid reasons provided by the minority and of other 
considerations raised by neither report does go to establish the case for which 
the minority argues. 
THE PURPOSE OF MORAL RIGHTS 
It is obviously important to understand what purposes moral rights serve. 
The Committee majority indeed took the minority to  task for failing to  
propose "a consistent theoretical base" for the doctrine, beyond a vaguely 
defined notion that some dealings with copyright works involved some 
"unfairness or impr~priety".~ The majority may be right to  some extent, 
although one might have thought that a demonstrated systematic "unfair- 
ness or impropriety" itself provided a ready basis for legislative action. The 
majority rightly pointed out that foreign jurisdictions have adopted differ- 
Copyright Law Review Committee, Report on Moral Rights (Australian Government Pub- 
lishing Service, Canberra), January 1988. The majority's summary of recommendations 
appears at p.10. 
3 Id., at pp.35-39, where the minority's reasons for its conclusion and its recommendations 
are summarized. 
Id., at pp.19-20. 
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ent models for their moral rights legislation, but then goes on to suggest that 
moral rights doctrine is therefore so confused that, on this ground alone, 
Australia should refuse to have anything to do with it. This is nonsense: is 
it a valid reason for deciding not to compensate victims of personal injuries 
in Australia that there are many different models, with quite different theo- 
retical bases even in common law countries, for compensating such victims? 
Moreover, if the absence of a consistent theoretical base were a reason for 
criticizing the introduction or continuation of legislation, much current legis- 
lation including copyright law itselfS would be in jeopardy - a logic that 
the Committee majority studiously avoided pursuing! 
Rather than our chasing the chimera of "a consistent theoretical base", 
it seems preferable to consider the point instrumentally: what purposes do 
moral rights serve? We should not be surprised to find that, without other 
supporting measures, such goals may be only imperfectly attained; but this 
is so of virtually any legal doctrine considered in isolation. 
According to Continental jurists, moral rights are justified on the basis 
of the close personal link between an author or artist and his or her work. 
The work emanates from and is an extension of the author. Just as any 
interference with the author's body is an assault, so any interference with 
the author's work is an assault on the work's, and hence the author's, integrity. 
Moral rights assure the author that the work is communicated to the public 
in the form the author intended. Continental systems classify the rights as 
personal, rather than proprietary; after the author's death, however, they 
may in some countries be exercised by the heirs or by a governmental body 
dedicated to the preservation of the country's cultural heritage.6 
This rather metaphysical conception of moral rights, with its idealist view 
of art and literature, may be useful as taxonomy but does not adequately 
explain the purpose of the rights, even in Continental systems of law. To 
equate mutilation of art and literature with maiming is a picturesque 
metaphor, but little more: chopping paintings is in fact different from chop- 
ping bodily parts and could fairly attract different social and legal responses. 
In fact, the growth of moral rights thinking in Europe at the end of the 18th 
and the beginning of the 19th centuries coincided with the growing economic 
independence of authors and artists, whose shackles of ecclesiastic, royal and 
seigneurial patronage had been loosened after the French revolution. In 
England, also, the snobbery that said gentle folk did not write for money 
began collapsing too: if a poet as dedicated to his art as Byron could, without 
corrupting his muse, accept substantial sums from his publisher, perhaps 
5 See, e.g., (now Judge) Breyer, "The Uneasy Case for Copyright" (1970) 84 Harv. L.R. 281, 
who finds little justification for copyright on either economic or non-economic grounds. 
6 See generally, Strauss, "The Moral Right of the Author" (1959), Study No. 4 prepared for 
the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright of the U.S. Senate Committee 
on thp Judiciary (86th Cong., 1st Sess.), 114; Stromholm, Le Droit Moral de /'Auteur en 
Droit allemand, frangais et scandinave (Stockholm, 1967); Karlen, "Moral Rights in California" 
(1982) 19 San Diego L.Rev. 675; Da Silva, "Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright" (1980) 
28 Bull. Copr. Soc.. 1. 
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doing creative work for a living was all right for lesser mortals too.' 
Creative people started behaving more and more like entrepreneurs: they 
needed to sell their works, to  build up a reputation with their public, and 
so to  increase the sales of their current and future works. For the most part, 
however, they did not accumulate the power and resources of entrepreneurs, 
but relied on middlemen publishers and, later, art dealers and film producers 
to  commercialize their works.8 Standard form contracts, drawn up by the 
entrepreneurs to give themselves as much leeway as possible in publishing 
the work, eventually became the norm: only best-selling authors and artists 
had much power to insist on contract modifications to protect their own 
interests better. Sometimes creative people joined to form a union to advance 
their interests, but few collectives gained any significant power. In addition, 
a sea change has occurred in public opinion about the preservation of 
mankind's cultural heritage. What was considered acceptable in the early 
nineteenth century, the elginisme that resulted in the desecration of the Parthe- 
non and which led to the modern feud between Britain and Greece concern- 
ing the fate of the marbles resting in the British Museum, has given way to 
international and national policies designed to keep art treasures i n t a ~ t . ~  
This suggests that moral rights rest on a number of bases that are more 
plausible than those dealing with metaphysical or idealistic notions of artists 
and art. The first basis is economic: moral rights are one form of truth-in- 
marketing legislation. The public is entitled to be told the truth about a work's 
authorshiplo and is entitled to have the work in the form the author inten- 
ded it to reach his or her public. This closely parallels the public interest func- 
tion of a trade mark: people rely on marks as an assurance of a certain qual- 
ity and are willing to pay more for a marked product than a generic brand.]] 
The mark owner can prevent goods bearing its mark from being sold or 
' This did not mean that 19th century authors were generally able to live off the fruits of their 
writing. Most needed support from formal institutions (e.g., in England, the Royal Literary 
Fund) or informal institutions, e.g., patrons including other successful writers. In The Common 
Writer: Life in Nineteenth Century Grub Street (Cambridge U.P., 1985), Nigel Cross states 
of this period: "[Tlhe calamities of authors are the natural consequence of writing for a living. 
Few activities other than gambling are so risky . . . As major writers are one in a thousand, 
999 people had to find ways and means of surviving as writers to enable a Dickens or a George 
Eliot to emerge from their ranks". (id., at 5-6) 
A survey of English writers in the mid 1960s revealed that half of those writing full time 
earned less than the minimum pay of a bus driver. Even the "most prolific and businesslike" 
major writer may end up earning less than the literary agent he employs: James Hepburn, 
The Author's Empty Purse and the Rise of the Literary Agent (Oxford U.P., 1%8), at 100 ff. 
Similar relativity may be expected in the other creative arts: e.g., the modern art dealer stands 
very much in the position of patron to the artists whose work he handles: E.B. Feldman, 
The Artist (Prentice-Hall, 1982), at 186 ff. 
Merryman, "Thinking about the Elgin Marbles" (1985) 83 Michigan L.R. 1880. See also Bator, 
"An Essay on the International Trade in Art" (1982) 34 Stanford L.R. 275. 
lo This does not prevent the well-known and accepted practice of anonymous and pseudony- 
mous publication. Just like a trade mark owner or, for that matter, any corporation, the 
author is entitled to choose under what name he wishes to be publicly or professionally known, 
or whether he wants to be known at all. The public entitlement is to receive the communica- 
tion credited as the author intended. 
'I Schechter, "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection" (1927) 40 Harv. L.R. 813. 
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perceived with modifications not authorized by the mark owner.'* Similar- 
ly, the choices that consumers of art, literature, music and drama exercise 
about what they wish to read or see depend upon whether or not they react, 
or have in the past reacted, favourably to a creator's work or his or her general 
repute: this assessment can be made fairly only if consumers have accurate 
information about the work and the author available to them. Thus, moral 
rights help to create and maintain a market in which consumer choice is more 
accurately channelled. 
Secondly, the public interest in the functioning of the market in creative 
works coincides with the author's own interest in gaining the due reward the 
market is willing to confer on his or her product. Creative people want their 
name to come before the public13 and their works to  be perceived as they 
intended. The more an author's fame increases, the more popular his work 
becomes and the more marketable become his future works.14 The converse 
is true if the author's work does not meet public acclaim. And so it should 
be. Having entered the marketplace, the author has to  accept its risks. His 
or her works and name may become known, and the author will prosper; 
they may remain unknown or become known and shunned, and the author 
will languish. These are the economics of fame, and common law courts every- 
where have recognized them in moral rights-type disputes.15 
Thirdly, creative people generally are not in as strong a bargaining posi- 
tion as the entrepreneurs with whom they have to deal in order to gain a 
market for their works.I6 Without moral rights, authors have nothing to 
Illustrated Newspapers Ltd v. Publicitv 
v. Canadian Spark Plug Service [I 9351 3 
v. Insert Media Ltd (19881 I W.L.R. 
'"here are obvious exceptions, both 
founded in the early 1930s to advance th 
in an anonymous pamphlet titled "Anor 
an audience distorted the purity of art 
ironically ended up having to discard 
port: see Hugh Ford, Published in Paris 
anonymity, see Anthony Trollope, "On 
491: "A man should always dare to be 
l 4  Thus, in Hepworth Mfg. Co. Ltd v. 
fully tried to stop one of its former stzrs 
evidence was that the new employer was 
employ, while his salary under a new narle 
and goodwill. 
l5 Thus, the High Court of Australia in 
322, at 338, approvingly quoted from 
Ltd 119361 2 All E.R. 1625, at 1526-7 
attracting the public to their works, be t 
men who write books or who perform 
Services Ltd [I 9381 Ch. 414; A.C.  Spark Plug Co. 
I). L. R. 84 (Exch. Ct .); Associated Newspapers P. L. C.  
909, 511 (Ch. D.). 
ancient and modern. Thus, the Carrefour Press was 
notion of complete anonymity in the arts. It claimed, 
yrnous: The Need for Anonymity", that writing for 
towards commercial ends. Despite its credo, the Press 
the principles i t  avowed through lack of author sup- 
(Macmillan, 1975). 290-7. For a contrary view on 
Anonymous Literature" (1862) 1 Fortnightly Review 
responsible for the work which he does . . . ." 
Ryott [I9201 1 Ch. 1 (C.A.), a film studio unsuccess- 
using his stage name with a new employer. The 
paying the actor twice the f 10 per week of his old 
would be £7 until he could establish a new identity 
Associated Newspapers Ltd v. Bancks (1 95 1) 83 C.L.R. 
dhddard J .  in Tolnay v. Criterion Film Prodrrction 
(K.B.D.): "All persons who have to make a living by 
ey artists in the sense of painters or be they literary 
in other branches of the arts, such as pianists and 
section. 
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bargain about. Even with moral rights, authors are not assured of further- 
ing their interests: at a time when moral rights were thought not to exist in 
the United States, the boilerplate of standard form contracts in the movie 
industry included a moral rights waiver clause." Granting authors moral 
rights will perhaps not remedy such abuses, but at least the prima facie 
presence of such rights will engage the court's jurisdiction to monitor waiver 
clauses for restraint of trade, unconscionability, undue influence and the 
various other devices available at common law or equity to  remedy abuse 
of bargaining power. l 8  
Fourthly, the modern movement to secure the preservation of man's 
cultural heritage is furthered by moral rights legislation. People are now more 
and more recognizing the importance, to  themselves and to future genera- 
tions, of providing and maintaining a record of current cultural achievements 
and of trying to  reconstruct those of the past. As Merryman puts it: 
[Mlonuments of human culture [are] an essential part of our common past. 
They tell us who we are and where we came from, give us cultural 
identity.19 
Strong moral rights legislation helps to attain these goals by co-opting those 
persons with a strong vested interest in a work - the author and his or her 
heirs - to keep intermeddlers at bay. The granting of a private right of action 
to  further policies of general public interest is hardly novel: witness section 
52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth.), where the desirable goal of purify- 
ing the marketplace of deceptive and misleading trade practices is furthered 
by providing traders with civil actions against competing miscreants. 
Admittedly, giving a private person the power to  champion the public weal 
is, without more, not the most effective means of attaining a public interest 
goal. And, since moral rights, on one model, are merely coterminous with 
copyright, they become ineffective as a work gets older: the matter will then 
be left to  contemporary public senstivity or, less likely in an era of avowed 
governmental dislike of bureaucracy, a cultural commission charged with 
monitoring moral rights abuses as part of a mandate of heritage preservation. 
at 119 ff. Moreover, before the copyright revisions in the U.S., U.K., Australia and New 
Zealand that occurred in the two decades after 1956, the copyright laws of those countries 
recognized this inferior bargaining position by provisions reverting copyright to the author 
or his heirs for the last part of the term. See ChappeN & Co. Ltd v. Redwood Music Co. 
Ltd [I9801 2 All E.R. 817, at 824 (H.L.); Ringer, "Renewal of Copyright" in Studies on 
Copyrrght (Fisher memorial ed., 1960): "author-publisher contracts must frequently be made 
at a time when the value of the work is unknown or conjectural and the author (regardless 
of his business ability) is necessarily in a poor bargaining position." The provision still exists 
in the Canadian Copyright Act R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, s.12(5) in the same form as it appeared 
in the Copyright Act 191 1 (U.K.) .  The elimination of the reversionary provisions in these 
countries was not prompted by any evidence that the imbalance of bargaining power between 
authors and copyright acquirers had mysteriously vanished. 
See the clause in Harris v. Twentieth Century Fox Frlm Corp. (1943) 139 F.2d 571. 
See Vaver, "Authors' Moral Rights - Reform Proposals in Canada: Charter or Barter of 
Rights for Creators?" (1988) 25 Osgoode Hall L. J .  000 (forthcoming). Of course, a jurisdic- 
tion serious about furthering the policies of moral rights would ensure that the rights were 
neither assignable nor waivable, as the Australian Copyright Council indeed has pointed out: 
"Moral Rights", Bulletin No. 50 (1984). at 15, suggesting the mediating concept of a "reason- 
able" moral right. 
19 Supra note 9, at 1895. 
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Thus, the realistic choice is between doing nothing and doing something, 
however attenuated. 
THE CASE AGAINST MORAL RIGHTS 
We shall now turn to the principal reasons that the Committee majority 
gave for refusing to recommend moral rights legislation. 
(a) Australia's international obligations 
The majority stated that the only basis upon which it could be persuaded 
to recommend moral rights legislation would be that "Australia's continuing 
membership of the Berne Convention so requires". It summarily concluded 
that the Berne Convention requires no  fi~rther protection than Australia 
already gives.*O The minority disagreed, claiming the Convention requires 
members to provide positive moral rights, not merely to allow authors to 
assert such rights. It went on to say that the patchwork of common law and 
statutory rules that could be enlisted in aid of moral rights was too inciden- 
tal and fragmentary to amount to compliance with the C o n ~ e n t i o n . ~ ~  
The strength of the majority's position is that it is difficult to disprove. 
The International Court of Justice, which has jurisdiction over the Berne 
Convention, has never had any dispute on the Convention brought to it. The 
prospect of any moral rights dispute being thus authoritatively decided is 
bleak. In addition, despite a strong trend of academic opinion that Aust- 
ralia is or may be in breach of its Berne  obligation^,^^ the Committee 
majority has a number of strong points on its side. First, both Britain and 
Australia took an active part at the 1928 Berne Conference in settling the 
present form of Article 6bis, avowedly to conform with their domestic 
common law, and the Rapporteur ~ e n e r a l  himself noted his opinion that 
the sources of moral rights protection in English law were the principles of 
common law and equity, as supplemented by statute law, without indicating 
that such protection did not meet the requirements of the new Article.23 The 
U.K. government more recently has thought that moral rights legislation was 
necessary in order to comply with the Paris 1971 text of the C o n v e n t i ~ n , ~ "  
but the Whitford Copyright Committee, which recommended such changes, 
was not prepared to go that far.25 Most recently, a report prepared for the 
20 Report, supra note 2, at 11. 
Id., at 62 ff. 
22 The minority report sets out the writing which supports its position: id., at 50 ff. 
22 Union Internationale pour la Protection des Oeuvres Litteraires et Artistiques, Actes de la 
Conference reunie a Rome du 7 mai au 2 juin 1928 (Berne 1929). at 283, n.2 (Stromholm, 
supra note 6, vol. 1, at 427, agrees in principle but is unprepared to say whether or not common 
law protection is adequate). The Rapporteur indeed singles out the Australian delegate, Sir 
William Moore, and praises his "high legal skills" in overcoming the initial textual difficul- 
ties to  produce the Article in its current form: id., at 201. 
24 S. Ricketson, The Law of Intellectual Property (Law Book Co., 1984), para. 15.80, who 
apparently agrees. 
25 Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs (H.M.S.O. London, 
1977), Cmnd. 6732, para. 53. The Committee did think that the U.K. was in default on the 
obligations to  provide that moral rights be coterminous with copyright. However, Article 
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U.S. State Department has claimed that the U.S.'s mixture of statute and 
common law protects moral rights sufficiently for the U.S. to be able to adhere 
to  the 1971 Paris text of the Berne Convention, relying on the similar posi- 
tion of Australia whose "adherence to Berne is unchallenged".*6 
Without a more extensive inquiry than is possible in this paper, the fairest 
verdict that can be reached on the Committee majority's opinion on this point 
is, except in some  respect^,^' "Not Disproven". But the Committee's terms 
of reference simply asked it whether or not legislative protection for moral 
rights was "needed''.28 A finding that Australia presently complies with its 
treaty obligations far from answers this question. 
(b) Moral rights are inconsistent with a common law system 
In the light of what has just been said, the Committee majority's claim 
that moral rights are "alien" and "foreign" to "a common law system"29 is 
nothing short of astonishing. 
First, it falsifies the assertions made by the Australian delegation to the 
1928 Rome revision of the Berne Conference, that the wording of Article 
6bis as finalized created no difficulties for its system of copyright and common 
law.30 The Committee majority fails to point out any development since 
1928 that undercuts the validity of those assertions, which moreover were 
shared by Britain and the other Empire delegates at the Conference3' and 
which were never repudiated at any later Berne conference. 
Secondly, the majority's claim contradicts its major premise: that Aust- 
ralia already protects moral rights sufficiently for it to be in compliance with 
the Berne Convention. If this is true, such rights logically cannot be alien 
or foreign to Australia's legal system. The only valid claim that can be made, 
consistent with that premise, is that any increase in the level of existing moral 
rights protection would be antithetical to Australia's legal system. But this 
much less grandiose assertion is no more valid than its bigger brother. 
Thirdly, the majority ignores the fact that copyright itsew is historically 
alien to a common law system. I t  needed legislation to set up a copyright 
system, since it was settled long ago that copyright in published works did 
not exist at common law. The Committee majority is certainly not asserting 
6bis(2) of the 1971 Paris text does allow exceptions from this position, and the Whitford 
Committee did not discuss whether the U.K.  could technically take advantage of these 
exceptions. 
'Vreliminary Report of the Ad H o c  Working Group on U.S. Adherence to Berne Conven- 
tion, December 1985 (1986) 33Jo. Cop. Soc. U.S.A. 183, at 214-5. The Report notes at  215 
the opinion of Arpad Bogsch, the director of the World intellectual Property Organization, 
which administers the Berne Convention, that statute and common law may combine to fulfill 
the obligation of Article 66;s. 
Passing off, widely touted as the principal common law action available to  authors having 
moral rights grievances, may not always be available. Two of its prerequisites, that the plaintiff 
have a business and that the work have a goodwill and reputation capable of injury, will 
be difficult of proof for struggling authors with little repertoire to their credit. 
LX Report, supra note 2, at p.1. 
'Y Id., at p.27. 
"' Supra note 23. 
Id., at pp.238-9 of the Conference proceedings. 
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that copyright exists as a matter of natural right, for to do so would auto- 
matically admit the case for moral rights. 
Fourthly, if the majority means to suggest that moral rights cannot exist 
in any common law system, it is simply wrong. Without being definitive, one 
may point out that India has had moral rights legislation since 1957,32 Israel 
introduced it in 1981,33 and Canada has had it since 1931!34 Even before 
then, the Chief Justice of Canada had, in an appeal from Ontario, a com- 
mon law province, stated that moral rights were part of the common law, 
as much as they were part of the civil law of Quebec.35 Indeed, perhaps 
paradoxically, the first Canadian case vindicating an artist's statutory moral 
rights was decided not in Quebec but in Ontario, where the judge in his 
discretion issued a mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring a defendant 
to remove material distorting a s~ulpture.3~ The most recent Copyright Bill 
introduced in the United Kingdom contains extensive provisions dealing with 
moral rights of integrity and paternity.37 The current Copyright Act 1956 
(U.K.) already contains limited provisions dealing with misattribution, an 
aspect of the right of paternity, upon which similar provisions in Australia 
and New Zealand are based.38 In the United States, California and New 
York have passed statutes providing for moral rights for visual artists.39 
Moreover, a U.S. federal court of appeals in 1976 said, in a case involving 
a successful moral rights claim for mutilating, of all things, a "Monty Python" 
television programme: 
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral 
rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks 
to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors. 
Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation 
that serves as the foundation for American copyright law [citations] can- 
not be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for mutila- 
tion or misrepresentation of their work to the public on which the artists 
are financially dependent. Thus courts have long granted relief for mis- 
representation of an artist's work by relying on theories outside the statu- 
tory law of copyright, such as contract law [citation] or the tort of unfair 
competition [citation]. Although such decisions are clothed in terms of 
proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's 
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a 
distorted form. [citations140 
32 Copyright Act 1957, s.57 (India). See Smt. Bhandari v. Kala Vikos Pictures Pvt. Ltd [I9871 
All India Reports (Delhi) 13. 
33 Copyright Ordinance (Amendment No. 4) Law 5741-1981, s.3, inserting new s.4a: see (19811 
Copyright 269. 
34 Now Copyright Act R.S.C. 1970, C. C-30, S. 12(7). For discussion of the Act, see Vaver, 
"Authors' Moral Rights in Canada" (1983) 14 I.I.C. 329. Canada has recently expanded these 
provisions by the Copyright Amendment Act 1988 (Can.), S.C. 1986-87-88, c. 15. 
35 Morang v. Le Sueur (1911) 45 S.C.R. 95, at 97-98, per Fitzpatrick C.J.C. 
36 Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd (1982) 70 C.P.R.(2d) 105 (Ont. H.C.). For comment, see 
Vaver, "Snow v. The Eaton Centre: Wreaths on Sculpture Prove Accolade for Artists' Moral 
Rights" (1983) 8 Can. Business Law Jo. 81. 
37 Copyright, Designs and Patents Bill 1987 (H.L.), Chapter IV. 
38 The Australian provisions are found in the Copyright Act 1968, ss.190 and 191. 
39 For comment on the California statute, see Karlen, supra note 6. 
40 (1976) 192 U.S.P.Q. 1, at 8-9 (C.A., 2nd Circ.). 
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Thus, in the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Israel, and the United States 
in both state and federal jurisdiction, either courts or legislatures or both 
have recognised that moral rights can be, and indeed have been, successfully 
integrated into a common law system. And Australia, like the United King- 
dom and New Zealand, already has integrated a partial right of paternity 
into its copyright law, without any strain on the common law system of any 
of these jurisdictions being perceptible. 
If the majority meant to present the more limited and more overtly 
xenophobic claim that such rights were "alien" or "foreign" to Australia's 
common law system, it signally failed to present any features that differen- 
tiated the Australian common law system from those of similar federal juris- 
dictions, such as the United States, Canada and India, or from the fount 
of common law systems, England. The implicit assertion that Australians 
value their property rights and resent any interference with them more 
intensely than any other subjects in a common law system is undocumented 
and seems totally implausible. 
In truth, in the sense that the majority seems to use the term "alien" or 
"foreign", moral rights are foreign to any legal system, common law or civil 
law, socialist or capitalist. The institution of private property is as firmly 
entrenched in France and Germany as it is in England or the United States; 
yet the two former jurisdictions have strong moral rights laws which can 
impinge on the unfettered enjoyment of certain kinds of private property. 
In Canada, private property is just as important in the civil law province 
of Quebec as in the common law provinces; nor is the position in Louisiana 
any different in this respect from other U.S. states. Socialist legal systems 
have moral rights firmly embedded in their laws; one might expect that 
individual assertions of such rights there might contradict notions that the 
community interest ought generally to prevail over that of the individual. 
At bottom, the majority's view should be treated for what it is: little more 
than an echo of some idealized pre-industrial golden age of T ~ r y i s m . ~ ~  
(c) Australians would not accept or respect moral rights 
The Committee majority claimed that Australians would neither under- 
stand nor, if understanding, accept limitations "on a person's use of his or 
her personal tangible property that are based upon another individual's per- 
ception of interest in that property".42 This claim is nowhere substantiated. 
Indeed, other claims made by the report cut down the width of this claim. 
Thus, the majority admits that "most" Australians would, and presumably 
do, recognize the right of paternity, by crediting authors whose work they 
reproduce.43 They therefore both understand and accept this right. There- 
fore, the Committee majority must think that legislating paternity rights 
*I Cons~der this revealing statement from the Committee majority: "The need to keep regula- 
tion to a minimum (and to reduce existing regulation) appears to be accepted by all major 
pol~tlcal parties and by the community as a whole." Report, supra note 2, at p.22. 
42 Id., at p.27. 
Id., at pp. 26, 28. 
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would cause Australians to change their habits and now perform wrongful 
acts. Why people would choose to act so perversely is not explained. 
Moreover, the majority cited no evidence for either its broader or nar- 
rower view that Australians do not understand and would not accept legis- 
lation on moral rights or some aspect of moral rights. There was no survey 
indicating Australians' attitudes on these questions, nor was it suggested that 
moral rights principles were beyond public comprehension. The majority's 
view seems little more than presumption. Politicians, more expert than most 
in gauging the public pulse on any issue, feel lucky if they get it right half 
the time. How a bare majority of a copyright law committee, neither represen- 
tative of the public nor expert in practical or theoretical political science, 
thought it accurately felt the public pulse remains a mystery. The majority 
dredges up picayune examples of actual or potential moral rights infringe- 
ments, and imagines that the public would react against such claims.44 But, 
like any reductio ad absurdum, this line of reasoning has its weaknesses. Thus, 
the majority seems to think that artists, complaining about their works being 
inadequately displayed, will go to court any time their demands are unmet. 
(Whether or not the artist has a genuine grievance does not seem to concern 
the majority.) But trivial complaints in moral rights cases are subject to the 
de minimis rule, with expensive consequences for  complainant^.^^ The direct 
and indirect costs of litigation are now so high everywhere that most com- 
plaints are either settled out of court or ignored; only where the perceived 
benefits of a successful result outweigh these costs will a case be pursued. 
Moreover, some people (perhaps not quite as many as the Committee majority 
imagines) might think that a sculptor should not be able to stop the opera- 
tors of a shopping mall, which owns the sculpture, from festooning the work 
with Christmas wreaths46 or any other decoration they feel like whenever 
they want. But would the public which pours in to see a Sidney Nolan 
exhibition accept with as much equanimity the sight of the artist's works 
decorated with jolly little red gnomes sitting among the gum-trees, because 
the current owner of the works thought that his over-painting would liven 
up the landscapes? People's reactions to the modification of art works are 
inextricably bound up with their appreciation of the initial work. To admit 
Nolan's right to prevent the owner of one of his paintings from publicly 
exhibiting it in a distorted form is to admit that other artists of lesser fame 
should have the same right. 
But the Committee majority's appeal to public sentiment is really just a 
red herring. If individual consumers were really interested about moral rights, 
one would have expected them or organisations representing them to have 
Id., at 14-15; 23-24. The Report also suggests that there are so many different sorts of cases 
in which moral rights claims could be made that there are insuperable difficulties in covering 
such areas. But this has not been the experience in any common law jurisdiction with a moral 
rights statute, whether drafted broadly as in Canada or in great detail as in California and 
(now) the U.K. 1987 bill (see supra note 37). Practical difficulties do and will arise in moral, 
rights cases, but they are solved as in any other area of the law: in the vast majority of cases, 
negotiation, and in a tiny minority, litigation. 
45 Crocker v. Papunya Tula Artists Pty Ltd (1985) 61 A.L.R. 529 (Fed. Ct.). 
Contrary to the result in Snow's case, supra note 36. 
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made submissions to the committee. But not one consumer or consumer 
organisation did so. This parallels experience elsewhere. Most individuals 
care little about moral rights, because they do not see the issue as affecting 
them. The vast majority does not own anything that would attract a moral 
rights suit. Those few people who do own valuable art works will not paint 
gnomes on them and cannot conceive of any other rational person doing so 
either. Most such people are or fancy themselves connoisseurs, who know 
better than to tamper with such works or who suspect, quite rightly, that 
tampering will reduce the work's value. 
The "public" about whom the majority is really talking is a quite different 
public, that of institutional dealers in copyright works: media entrepreneurs, 
museums, art galleries and dealers, and the like. Now, this "public" might 
indeed view with alarm any attempt to interfere with its power over creative 
works and might indeed try to mobilise the larger public to share its opinion. 
But experience elsewhere indicates that the fears of these institutions are un- 
justified. commercial life goes on without substantial hindrance in strong 
moral rights countries as it does in countries with weak or no moral rights. 
All that happens in the former is that the author or artist, who has not validly 
waived his or her moral rights, is admitted to have some say in how a work 
is later exploited. The spectre of the obstinate author habitually making 
unreasonable demands is as much a caricature as the spectre of the habitually 
deforming entrepreneur. As in most spheres of social life, compromises are 
made and agreements are reached, because the parties recognise and respect 
their mutual interdependence. 
(d) Miscellaneous Difficulties 
A number of other points are made in the majority report, which may 
be considered more briefly. 
The majority claimed that the creative community as a whole showed 
insufficient interest in moral rights and that very few justifiable cases of 
infringements of such rights had been dem~nstrated.~'  What constitutes 
sufficient pressure and how one finds out what moral rights grievances are 
occurring in a community are debatable points. Industry pressure is obviously 
more concentrated and organized than the pressure that authors and their 
organisations can bring to bear on an issue. But, the majority failed to recog- 
nize that not only Australian creators are affected. Under the Berne Con- 
vention, foreign authors are entitled to assert moral rights here, and there 
is no indication that they or their representative organisations were called 
on to make submissions. This failure of natural justice in itself is enough 
to vitiate the majority's assertion. In any event, some might argue that the 
political process has failed if it refuses to redress a justifiable grievance of 
even one of its citizens. The Committee majority's relegation of such 
grievances to the realm of education and "community protests and 
47 Report, supra note 2, at 20, 26. 
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pressures"48 is nothing more than a cynical attempt to reduce the creative 
community to a fringe group in society. Authors deserve better than this. 
Who should judge infringements of moral rights, the regular courts or some 
specialised tribunal such as the Copyright Tribunal, is not a question of central 
importance. The majority's claim that judges would find such cases 
difficult49 is perhaps true, but Australian judges are called on to dispose of 
much more difficult cases than these. In cases involving art and literature, 
past experience indicates that they have managed to combine sensitivity with 
robust common sense.50 To suggest that moral rights cases are not justici- 
able is demonstrably wrong, in the light of the experience in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
Another reason the Committee majority dredges up to bolster its case 
against moral rights is that copyright owners have a difficult enough job in 
persuading the public not to infringe copyright in certain cases; how much 
more difficult it would be to persuade the public not to infringe moral 
rights!51 This argument has been partly answered already: the public that 
is photocopying and home-taping is not likely to be the same public whom 
authors would take to task over moral rights  infringement^;^^ nor would the 
people seeking to enforce moral rights - authors and the like - necessarily 
be the same as the copyright owners. In any event, the Committee majority 
chooses to ignore the issues of comparative morality involved here. Is there 
no moral difference between a person buying a record and making a tape 
of it to avoid scratches on the disc (copyright infringement!) and one who 
"improves" a Nolan painting by painting gnomes on it? A report that would 
give the copyright owner a cause of action in the first case and Nolan no 
right whatsoever in the second demonstrates its own moral sterility. 
CONCLUSION 
Hugh Collins recently asserted that "the mental universe of Australian 
politics is essentially Benthamite" and that "[flor practitioners and observers 
alike, the compelling proofs of a political proposal in Australia are the twin 
utilitarian standards of efficacy (will it work?) and plurality (have you got 
the  number^?)."^^ The Copyright Law Review Committee's majority Report 
on Moral Rights is an example of Collins' phenomenon in the copyright field. 
Issues of justice and morality become subservient to expedience and niggardly 
48 Id., at 17, 29-30. Is it any wonder, then, that Leonie Kramer talks of the "air of fragility 
about the creative arts in Australia, evidenced partly by a certain defensiveness in artists"? 
Kramer, "The Media, Society, and Culture" (1985) 114 Daedalus 293, at 304. 
49 Id., at 16-17. 
50 See, e.g., the Bancks case, supra note 15 and A. G. v. Trustees of National Art Gallery of 
N.S. W. (1945) 62 W.N.(N.S.W.) 212, for a sensitive concern to the problems of artists; cf. 
Crocker, supra note 45, for a robust application of de minimis. 
5' Report, supra note 2, at 28. 
52 Text supra following note 46. 
53 Collins, "Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society" (1985) 
114 Daedalus 147, at 148, 156. 
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positivism. That this attitude appears in the work of a specialised law reform 
committee, supposed to be far removed spiritually from the hurly-burly of 
political debate, is all the more amazing. 
Australian policy should not be formulated on the basis of the majority 
Report. Experience in jurisdictions with similar legal systems to Australia 
has shown that moral rights can be a positive force in a country's culture, 
not something to be feared and distrusted. The only entities that have anything 
to fear from moral rights are the occasional institutions who, in dealing with 
creative works, believe that what is good for them is also good for Aust- 
ralia. They should be put in their place. 
The minority Report supplies the basis of a working model for moral rights 
legislation. It may not be perfect. But if the government decides to adopt 
the policy of protecting moral rights through legislation, the contours of such 
legislation find a ready shape in that part of the Report. 
